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Precommitment, or taking away a future choice from oneself, is a mechanism for overcoming 
impulsivity. Here we review recent work suggesting that precommitment can be best explained 
through a distributed decision-making system with multiple discounting rates. This model 
makes specific predictions about precommitment behavior and is especially interesting in light 
of the emerging multiple-systems view of decision-making, in which functional systems with 
distinct neural substrates use different computational strategies to optimize decisions. Given 
the growing consensus that impulsivity constitutes a common point of breakdown in decision-
making processes, with common neural and computational mechanisms across multiple 
psychiatric disorders, it is useful to translate precommitment into the common language of 
temporal difference reinforcement learning that unites many of these behavioral and neural data.
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It seems illogical on the surface, but humans 
and other animals sometimes put themselves 
in situations to prevent themselves from being 
given an option that they would choose if given 
the chance. They will even expend effort and 
cost to avoid being given the future option. 
Such restriction of one’s own future choices 
is called precommitment. It is theorized that 
precommitment occurs because humans and 
other animals have different preferences at 
different times (Strotz, 1955; Ainslie, 1992). 
Precommitment behaviors take many forms, 
ranging from purely external mechanisms like 
flushing cigarettes down the toilet, to purely 
internal mechanisms like making a promise to 
oneself that one is unwilling to break, to inter-
mediate mechanisms like making a public state-
ment about one’s intentions.
Precommitment is ubiquitous in human 
behavior. “Christmas Clubs,” popularized during 
the Great Depression, enforced saving through the 
year for Christmas shopping (Strotz, 1955). In the 
modern era, websites like stickk.com  automatically 
transfer money from a credit card to a designated 
recipient (such as a charity) if the user fails to meet 
a specified goal (as reported by a trusted third 
party). In Australia, Canada, and Norway, many 
gambling machines require the gambler to pre-
set a limit on his or her expenditure, after which 
the machine deactivates (Ladouceur et al., 2012). 
(Some gamblers also spontaneously create their 
own precommitment strategies, Wohl et al., 2008; 
Ladouceur et al., 2012.) In day-to-day experience, 
people place the ice cream out of sight, put money 
into a retirement account with withdrawal penal-
ties, walk a different route to avoid seeing a store 
where there is temptation to buy something, or 
self-impose deadlines with self-imposed punish-
ments (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).
Precommitment behavior has been demon-
strated in animals (Rachlin and Green, 1972; 
Ainslie, 1974), but there is not yet an established 
laboratory paradigm for eliciting precommitment 
behavior in humans. Although precommitment 
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can be predicted to occur as a direct consequence 
of time-dependent changes in preference order 
(Ainslie, 1992), explicit neural and computational 
models of precommitment remain limited. In 
our paper, “A reinforcement learning model of 
precommitment in decision-making” (Kurth-
Nelson and Redish, 2010), we examined whether 
current computational models of decision-mak-
ing can explain precommitment and what those 
models imply for the mechanisms that underlie 
precommitment. Here, we will focus on inte-
grating those results into the broader picture of 
decision-making.
Valuation and discounting
Psychologists and economists (and now, neuro-
economists) operationalize the decision-making 
process through the framework of valuation. 
Whenever an organism (which we will call an 
“agent” here, to allow for easy translation between 
simulations and real organisms) is faced with a 
choice, each possible outcome is assigned a value. 
These values are compared, and the outcomes 
with higher values are more likely to be chosen 
(Glimcher, 2008). Although there are additional 
action-selection systems which do not work this 
way (such as reflexes), there is a compelling body 
of evidence that valuation plays a role in the mak-
ing of many choices. Neural correlates of value-
based decision-making have been identified in 
many parts of the brain (Rangel et al., 2008; Kable 
and Glimcher, 2009).
Rewards become less valued as they are more 
delayed – a phenomenon known as temporal or 
delay discounting. A discounting function is a 
quantitative description of this decay in value 
(Ainslie, 1992; Mazur, 1997; Madden and Bickel, 
2010). The discounting function of an individ-
ual human subject can be measured empirically 
with a series of questions (for example, “Would 
you prefer $30 today or $100 in a year?”), and is 
generally stable over time (Ohmura et al., 2006; 
Takahashi et al., 2007; Jimura et al., 2011).
The simplest discounting function is one that 
decays exponentially. In exponential discounting, 
each unit of delay reduces value by the same per-
centage. However, when measured empirically, 
the discounting functions of humans and ani-
mals are not exponential (Ainslie, 1992; Madden 
and Bickel, 2010). Instead, they are steeper than 
exponential at short delays, and shallower than 
exponential at long delays (Figure 1). Hyperbolic 
functions are often used to fit these curves, but 
for our purposes it is not critical whether the 
shape is actually hyperbolic; only that it is more 
concave than exponential. All non-exponential 
functions show preference reversals (Strotz, 
1955; Frederick et al., 2002) – an option preferred 
today is not necessarily preferred tomorrow.
Precommitment can be explained as a con-
sequence of preference reversal (Ainslie, 1992; 
Kurzban, 2010).; (Figure 1). Fundamentally, 
precommitment entails both the preference at 
one time for a smaller reward available sooner 
(smaller-sooner, SS) over a larger reward that 
one must wait for (larger-later, LL) – and also the 
preference at an earlier time for LL over SS. In the 
diagram of Figure 1A, an agent with a preference 
reversal would prefer SS over LL in situation C, 
but LL over SS in situation P. This means that in 
situation P the agent has an incentive to prevent 
itself from reaching choice C, and to instead go 
to situation N, in which it has no choice – thereby 
precommitting to LL.
computational models of 
precommitment
Temporal difference reinforcement learning 
(TDRL) is often used to bridge the gap between 
descriptive theoretical models of decision-making 
and their neural implementation. Because of its 
biological plausibility, guaranteed convergence, 
and power to explain behavior and neural activ-
ity (Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998; 
Roesch et al., 2012), TDRL has become a well-
established model of value-based decision-mak-
ing (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz, 1998).
TDRL assumes that an agent can take actions, 
some of which are rewarded. The goal is to 
learn to take actions that maximize the reward 
received (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Distinct sit-
uations of the world are represented as states. 
TDRL aims to estimate the value of each state, 
which is defined as the total discounted future 
reward expected from that state. This is a recur-
sive definition: the value of a state can be defined 
as the discounted value of the next state plus 
the reward available in the next state (Bellman, 
1957). To learn these values, on every state tran-
sition, TDRL calculates the difference between 
the discounted value of the new state (plus the 
reward received if any) and the value of the old 
state. This difference defines a prediction error in 
the value estimation. When this prediction error, 
scaled by a learning rate, is added to the value 
estimate, the estimated value is brought closer 
to the true value. Under appropriate conditions 
(a stable world, complete exploration, etc.), the 
value function will converge to the true value 
function, and, once the values associated with 
each state are learned, optimal behavior can be 
achieved by selecting the available action lead-
ing to the highest-value state. Although the basic 
model of TDRL is incomplete (Niv et al., 2006; 
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Precommitment
Taking away a choice from one’s future 
self in order to enforce one’s present 
preferences.
Delay discounting
The attenuation in subjective value of 
rewards that will be delivered in the 
future. Delay discounting is typically 
measured by posing decisions between 
smaller immediate rewards and larger 
delayed rewards. Subjects with steep 
discounting will demand a large 
increase in the magnitude of a reward 
in order to tolerate a delay in its receipt.
Preference reversal
An instability in preferences over time, 
such that at one time, X is preferred 
over Y, but at another time, Y is 
preferred over X. Preference reversal is 
central to impulsivity disorders. For 
example, drugs are rarely preferred over 
healthy choices when the choice is 
viewed from a distance, but often 
preferred when immediately available. 
Therefore it is critical to have 
mechanisms to enforce the healthy 
preferences.
Temporal difference reinforcement 
learning (TDRL)
A standard computational framework 
that helps to explain behavioral and 
neural data. TDRL works by calculating 
a prediction error at each time step, 
which encodes the difference between 
expected and actual reward. This 
prediction error is used to update 
expectations such that future prediction 
errors are minimized. A signal 
resembling this prediction error is 
coded by midbrain dopamine neurons.
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O’Doherty, 2012; van der Meer et al., 2012), it 
remains the starting point for computational 
models of decision-making.
In the standard implementation of TDRL, 
there is a state transition on every time step. 
Exponential discounting can therefore be calcu-
lated very straightforwardly by taking the value of 
the current state to be the value of the next state 
(plus the reward received if any) times a constant 
γ (0 < γ < 1). In this formulation, each unit of time 
causes the same attenuation of value, which is the 
definition of exponential discounting. However, 
non-exponential discounting has been difficult 
to implement in TDRL. There have been a hand-
ful of attempts at performing non-exponential 
(specifically, hyperbolic) discounting within a 
TDRL model (Daw, 2000, 2003; Kurth-Nelson 
and Redish, 2009; Alexander and Brown, 2010). 
We examined precommitment behavior in these 
four TDRL models (Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 
2010).
We found that three of these four models 
produced hyperbolic discounting only in special 
cases (either across a single state transition, or in 
an environment with no choices) and therefore 
were unable to produce precommitment. The 
other model produced hyperbolic discounting 
in arbitrary state-spaces and was able to produce 
precommitment. The successfully precommitting 
model was the μAgents model that we introduced 
in 2009 – in this model, a set of exponentially 
discounting TDRL agents operating in paral-
lel, each with a different discounting rate, and 
each maintaining its own estimate of the value 
function, collectively approximate hyperbolic 
discounting behavior (Figure 2; Kurth-Nelson 
and Redish, 2009). By using a distributed repre-
sentation of value, the μAgents model can track 
hyperbolic discounting across multiple state 
transitions. The distributed representation of 
value used by the μAgents model can represent 
more than just the mean expected value of a given 
state. This allows the μAgents model to discount 
hyperbolically across multiple state transitions, 
which enables preference reversal and therefore 
precommitment.
A TDRL model of precommitment gives us a 
concrete computational hypothesis with which 
to explore potential mechanisms by which people 
choose to precommit. More generally, it is also 
important to have computational models that 
describe choice in complex state-spaces (Kurth-
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Figure 1 | Precommitment arises from hyperbolic but not exponential discounting. (A) A state-space for 
precommitment (from Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2010). The agent first chooses whether to enter state C or state N. From 
state C, a standard intertemporal choice is available, between a larger reward available later (LL) and a smaller reward 
available sooner (SS). This choice is outlined with a dashed box. But from state N, only LL is available. Thus choosing N 
represents precommitment. (B) In exponential discounting, values decay by the same percentage for each unit of delay, 
so if SS is preferred at state C, it must also be preferred at state N. (C), In hyperbolic discounting, values decay more 
steeply proximally to the outcome, so it is possible for SS to be preferred at state C, but for LL to be preferred at state N.
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mitment (Ainslie, 1992, 2001) has been noted 
for decades, several non-intuitive consequences 
appeared when precommitment was imple-
mented in a computational model.
First, the theoretical model predicts that pre-
commitment is increased when there is a larger 
contrast between the SS and LL options. In other 
words, precommitment will be more favored if 
LL is very large and very delayed, compared to SS 
(of course, if LL is very large but not very delayed, 
then it will simply be preferred over SS at any time 
point, and precommitment will not be required). 
This suggests that, in the case of addiction, if we 
want to encourage precommitment, it is impor-
tant to define the perceived alternative to drug use 
as being a major outcome, such as the long-term 
health and safety of oneself or family members 
(Heyman, 2009). It is less likely that people would 
spontaneously precommit if the only perceived 
alternative to drug use were a modest outcome 
such as saving the money one would have spent 
on the drugs. Recent work on contingency man-
agement (CM, in which a concrete alternative 
is offered to remain abstinent from drugs) sug-
gests that the most effective CM procedures entail 
working toward a very large concrete reward far in 
the future (such as a big-screen television; Petry, 
2012).
Nelson and Redish, 2012). For example, the same 
model that allows the analysis of precommitment 
can also be used to analyze bundling. Bundling is 
another strategy that may be used to overcome 
an impulsive discounting function (Ainslie and 
Monterosso, 2003), but unlike precommitment, 
bundling does not require advance preparation. 
In bundling, choices are treated as categorical. 
For example, rather than thinking “Do I want 
to smoke one cigarette?” one would think, “Do I 
want to smoke cigarettes?” Non-exponential dis-
counters will often say yes to the former question 
and no to the latter, at the same time (Rick and 
Loewenstein, 2008). This dichotomy suggests a 
multi-faceted value function, such that differ-
ent components of the valuation process lead 
to different answers and internal conflict which 
needs to be resolved before an action can be 
taken (Kurzban, 2010; van der Meer et al., 2012; 
Wunderlich et al., 2012).
predictions about precommitment 
behaVior
Computational models allow exploration of 
parameter spaces. Although the fact that non-
exponential (e.g., hyperbolic) discounting leads 
to preference reversals (Strotz, 1955; Frederick 
et al., 2002) and to the potential for precom-
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Figure 2 | Distributed discounting enables precommitment in temporal difference learning. (A) Twenty 
exponential curves with discounting rates spread uniformly between 0 and 1 are shown in black. The average of these 
curves is shown in red. This average curve closely approximates a hyperbolic function. (B) Standard TD models cannot 
precommit because, at each state transition, discounting starts over, ensuring that if SS is preferred over LL at the time of 
C, then it is also preferred at the time of P (top pair of curves). When averaging a set of exponential discount curves, 
discounting is not reset at each state transition, so preferences can reverse between C and P (bottom pair of curves).
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multiple systems
As noted above, TDRL models are incomplete 
descriptions of the full range of animal (includ-
ing human) behavior (O’Doherty, 2012). Recent 
work suggests that there are at least three behav-
ioral controllers functioning in tandem: habitual, 
deliberative, and Pavlovian (Daw et al., 2005, 
2011; Dayan et al., 2006; Redish et al., 2008; 
Fermin et al., 2010; Glascher et al., 2010; Simon 
and Daw, 2011; Huys et al., 2012; van der Meer 
et al., 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012). This leads to 
the multiple-systems theory of decision-making, 
which says that multiple decision-making con-
trollers interact to make decisions. Habitual 
decision-making entails incremental learning 
of inflexible stimulus-action relationships that 
are released upon exposure to certain stimuli; 
deliberative decision-making entails search and 
evaluation through a representation of the causal 
structure of the world; and Pavlovian decision-
making entails the release of species-specific 
approach and avoidance reactions in response to 
unconditioned or conditioned stimuli. TDRL is 
generally taken to be a model of habitual behavior.
There are two basic possibilities for how pref-
erence reversals, and therefore precommitment, 
arise within the context of these multiple systems. 
The first possibility is that preference reversals 
are inherent within a single instrumental system. 
For example, precommitment may arise entirely 
within the habitual system as a consequence of 
multiple exponential discount rates operating in 
parallel. In this case, precommitment would exist 
even without an interaction between multiple sys-
tems, and would occur without conscious antici-
pation of a preference reversal; it would occur 
entirely as a consequence of differential reinforce-
ment (Ainslie, 1974).
The second possibility is that preference 
reversals stem from interactions between systems 
(Bechara et al., 1998; McClure et al., 2004; Dayan 
et al., 2006; Haidt, 2006; Kurzban, 2010). For 
example, the deliberative system may discount 
exponentially, such that LL is preferred from C 
within the deliberative system; but when faced 
with an imminent choice of SS, the Pavlovian 
system adds to the total value of SS such that it 
is ultimately chosen. From the vantage of P, SS 
is not imminent, so the Pavlovian approach is 
absent and the deliberative system can choose 
N without hindrance. Thus there is an apparent 
reversal of preference. Reversal could also arise 
from an interaction between the habitual and 
deliberative systems. Suppose that the habitual 
system has a faster discounting rate than the 
deliberative system and that it dominates at state 
C (where there is less uncertainty, Daw et al., 
Second, we can predict that there is a com-
plex effect of an agent’s discounting rate on their 
ability to precommit. When an agent is highly 
impulsive (fast discounting rate), it will be highly 
sensitive to the delay between precommitment 
and choice. If this delay is small, precommit-
ment is unfavorable, but as this delay increases, 
the preference for precommitment increases 
steeply. On the other hand, if an agent is rela-
tively patient (slow-discounting rate), then it 
will be largely insensitive to the delay between 
precommitment and choice, exhibiting at best 
a mild preference for precommitment for any 
value of this delay. Thus, the highest overall pref-
erence for precommitment appears in the most 
impulsive agents. On the surface this appears a 
bit paradoxical: the people with the strongest 
preference for an impulsive choice are the ones 
most likely to employ a strategy that curtails 
their ability to reach it. However, this finding 
suggests that in addiction, treatment strategies 
should be tailored to the individual depend-
ing on his or her own discounting rate. For 
fast discounters, inserting more time between 
precommitment and choice is essential – while 
for slow discounters, the theory predicts that it 
won’t make much of a difference. In fact, for 
slow-discounting addicts, precommitment may 
not be a useful strategy at all.
Third, the model predicts that precommit-
ment is highly sensitive to the precise shape of 
an agent’s discounting function (Figure 3). Our 
theoretical analysis reveals that two discounting 
functions that are both fit by nearly identical 
hyperbolic parameters can exhibit entirely dif-
ferent patterns of precommitment behavior. In 
particular, the simulations in Kurth-Nelson and 
Redish (2010) illustrated that precommitment 
depends on the shape of the tail of the discount-
ing function. When the tail of the discounting 
function is slightly depressed, precommitment 
behavior can be abolished for some ranges of 
reward magnitudes and delays. This finding 
indicates that beyond tailoring treatment to 
an individual’s best-fit discounting rate, it may 
provide further therapeutic power to design 
behavioral interventions most likely to work 
with the shape of the individual’s discount-
ing function. Additionally, any treatments 
that modulate the shape of the discounting 
function may produce large effects on pre-
commitment behavior. For example, boosting 
serotonin appears to preferentially select slow-
discounting components (Tanaka et al., 2007; 
Schweighofer et al., 2008), which should boost 
the tail of the discounting curve and improve 
precommitment.
Multiple-systems theory of 
decision-making
Machine learning research shows that 
there are different computational 
approaches to solving the problem of 
producing behavior that maximizes 
reward. Neural recordings suggest that 
each of these different algorithms are 
implemented in the brain, in distinct 
but overlapping areas.
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systems. In the first case, the TDRL model 
describes precommitment within the instru-
mental habit learning system and is agnostic 
to the interaction of this system with other 
decision-making systems. In the second case, 
the model illustrates the general principle that 
multiple simultaneous processes with different 
effective discounting rates produce precom-
mitment. These processes may be a mixture of 
goal-directed and habitual systems, or a mix-
ture of instrumental and Pavlovian systems. 
In the second case, the model’s prediction that 
precommitment is sensitive to the exact shape 
of the effective discount curve implies that pre-
commitment is sensitive to the exact interplay 
between systems. Particularly intriguing is the 
role of the deliberative system in shaping pre-
commitment. The deliberative system entails 
searching through future possibilities, which 
suggests that decisions are strongly influenced 
by the cognitive process of search, and by the 
2005). Meanwhile, the deliberative system, with 
a slower discounting rate, dominates at state P. 
The transition from deliberative to habitual con-
trol between P and C would lead to an observed 
preference reversal.
In other words, the deliberative system would 
have insight into the expected future impulsive 
choice of the habitual system, and would choose 
to take an action leading to a situation where the 
habitual or Pavlovian system would not have the 
impulsive action available. Interestingly, explicit 
insight or cognitive recognition of future impul-
sivity is sometimes assumed to be necessary 
for precommitment (Baumeister et al., 1994; 
Kurzban, 2010; Baumeister and Tierney, 2011), 
but the extent to which precommitment depends 
on insight is unknown at this time.
These two possibilities suggest different 
ways in which our model of precommitment 
(Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2010) fits into the 
broader context of multiple decision-making 
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Figure 3 | Shape of discounting curve strongly influences precommitment. (A) The actual discounting curves of 
two individuals are shown in solid lines, and the best-fit hyperbolic curves are shown in dashed lines. These two subjects 
were both fit by a hyperbolic function with ln(K) of approximately 0 (from a range of −13 to +4 across subjects). (B) 
Predicted precommitment behavior, based on actual discounting curve shape of each subject, using the following 
parameters: DC = 6 days, DL = 1 day, DS = 0, RL = $150, RS = $100. Subject 1 is expected to have a modest preference for 
SS over LL, and to be averse to precommitment. Meanwhile, subject 2 is expected to have a strong preference for SS 
over LL, but to favor precommitment. (Data from Chopra et al., 2009, used with permission.)
Impulsivity
Impulsivity can refer to the inability to 
inhibit ongoing actions, inability to 
stick with a long-term plan, or 
unwillingness to make effort or wait to 
get a reward. Each of these phenomena 
reflects a lack of top-down or executive 
control. In this paper, we focus on 
unwillingness to wait for delayed 
rewards.
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representations of those possibilities (Kurth-
Nelson et al., 2012). If this deliberative role in 
precommitment is in fact the case, then pre-
commitment is likely to have a complex inter-
action with cognitive processes like working 
memory.
computational psychiatry
Psychiatry is the study of dysfunction within 
cognitive and decision-making systems. Whereas 
traditional psychiatry classifies dysfunctions into 
categories based on external similarities, new pro-
posals have suggested that classification would be 
better served by addressing the underlying dys-
function. The emerging field of computational 
psychiatry suggests that computational models 
of underlying neural mechanisms can provide a 
more reasoned basis for the nature of dysfunc-
tion and the modality of treatment (Redish et al., 
2008; Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 
2012).
Impulsivity is a strong candidate for such a 
trans-disease mechanism (Bickel et al., 2012; 
Robbins et al., 2012). Impulsive choices underlie 
several different psychiatric disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Heyman, 2009; 
Madden and Bickel, 2010), and there appear to 
be similar neural bases for impulsivity across 
these disorders (Dalley et al., 2008; Robbins 
et al., 2012).
Precommitment is a powerful strategy to 
combat impulsivity. Although addicts have faster 
discounting rates on average than non-addicts 
(Bickel and Marsch, 2001), the distributions of 
addicts’ and non-addicts’ discounting rates over-
lap substantially. Furthermore, of all major psy-
chiatric disorders, addiction has by far the highest 
rate of spontaneous remission (Heyman, 2009), 
despite the stability of discounting rates over time 
(Kirby, 2009). This suggests that people can over-
come addiction despite continuing to have impul-
sive underlying preferences. Precommitment is 
an ideal strategy for an impulsive agent to make 
healthy choices. Some people may spontaneously 
acquire precommitment strategies, while others 
may benefit from being explicitly instructed in 
such strategies.
Models of precommitment (Kurth-Nelson and 
Redish, 2010) make predictions about what pre-
commitment strategies will be most effective in 
treating impulsivity disorders such as addiction. 
They predict that more impulsive individuals will 
be more sensitive to the delay between the option 
to precommit and the availability of the impulsive 
choice. They also predict that precommitment 
depends on the precise shape of the discounting 
curve, such that two individuals with the same 
discounting rate can exhibit very different pre-
commitment behavior.
The latter is particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that it is possible to change an individ-
ual’s discounting function. For example, Bickel 
et al. (2012) found that working memory train-
ing decreases impulsivity. Others have shown 
that differences in executive function abilities 
predict differences in impulsivity (Burks et al., 
2009; Romer et al., 2011), which suggests that 
improving executive function could reduce 
impulsivity. On the other hand, imposing cog-
nitive load makes subjects more impulsive (Vohs 
and Faber, 2007; Vohs et al., 2008). It is not yet 
known whether the improvements in discount-
ing functions from working memory training are 
due to strengthening of long-sighted neural sys-
tems, weakening of short-sighted neural systems, 
or a change in the interplay between the two. Nor 
is it yet known how these manipulations interact 
with precommitment as a treatment paradigm 
for addiction.
Finally, the TDRL model depends on having 
a state-space where precommitment is avail-
able as an option. This opens the very impor-
tant and poorly explored question of how the 
brain constructs the state-space. In the context 
of the issues examined here, the brain needs to 
recognize that precommitment is available. It 
may be that factors such as working memory 
and other cognitive resources are important for 
flexibly constructing adaptive state-spaces, and 
this may be an essential part of recovery. Even 
verbally instructing an individual that precom-
mitment is available might be enough to help 
create the state-space that TDRL or other learn-
ing processes could use for precommitment. The 
ability to form representations of the world that 
support healthy strategies, even in the face of 
high underlying impulsivity, may be one of the 
most important factors in recovery from disor-
ders like addiction.
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